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SOBE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TIlE SOUTH 
(By Earl D. C. Bret·1er, Professor of Sociology and Religion, Canqler 
School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322. ':~ 
For use in the Southeastern Regional Consultation of the General 
Board of Education, November 4-8, 19611., j~tlanta, Georgia.) 
It is a privilege to speak on this theme in this conference. Especially so, 
since you are concerned with the nurture and mission of the Christian faith and 
its implications for modern life. Only the arrogant or the ignorant would assume 
the time or talent to do more than trace in a tentative outline some of the impor-
tant aspects of the topic. Most of this sl~etch Hill be familiar background to 
most of you. Yet this very familiarity soothes our sensitivity, solidifies our 
stereotypes, smoothes out the sharpness of contrasts, and makes sameness out of 
strangeness. Paradoxically t ~le tend to knotV both most and least about the things 
closest to us. Let us try to stand back from our Southland and revie~11 a general 
picture painted with a few broad strokes. 
The Southland is a regional part of the nation. A region stresses its Ot-ID 
uniqueness l-Jithin the unity of the nation. Sometimes the South has acted like a 
section, stressing its individuality against the national unity. He are celebrat-
ing during this decade the centennial of a terrible war resulting from these 
sectionalistic tendencies breaking apart our federal union. Certainly our so-
called "southern ",ay of life" roots its past in the plantation system, in rural ism, 
in a segregated bi-racial pattern, states' rights, and fundamentalistic Protestant-
ism. Each of these traditional elements is being challenged by national trends. 
Plantation-type agriculture is giving Hay to mechanized farming, industrialism is 
overcoming ruralism, integration of the races is biting into the old doctrine of 
segregation, states' rights political views are constantly being bombarded by 
centralized federal government, and an uneasy conscience is appearing in Protest-
ant religious circles. The Sout~is, indeed, a region in ferment. 
To outsiders, the region may seem to be the "Solid South," and many insiders 
are lulled into this same monolithic vieu. But to students of the South it is a 
land of contrasts, a region of subregions, a mosaic of vivid differences. There 
is the old plantation area running from the ocean coastline or the river delta to 
the hill country. This is the usual stereotype of the "glory that l-laS the Old 
South. It Next is the piedmont or hilly area, running in several states bad: to the 
mountains. This is the area that industrialized first and notll tends to approxi-
mate the national norms more closely than any other part of the South. The moun-
tain sections of several southern states constitute another subregion recently 
emerging from the isolation and individualism, the poverty and puritanism charac-
teristic of American frontiers. Uithin these three broad subregions there are 
others. Perhaps the most important subregionalization of the South today is 
that of metropolitan subregions and nonmetropolitan or rural subregions. There 
are many souths, not one. Let us hold this caution sign over any broad sweeping 
generalizations about the South, including our o~m. 
Basically, the South is a region of traditionalism in transition. Some 
point tli th pride to the achievements of our forefathers. Others tJorship the 
"southern ~"ay of life" as a religion. Some vietl1 tlith alarm changes in the old 
patterns. Hanyare sovereign southerners before they are Americans--Americans 
before they are Christians. Yet everYHhere traditionalism is in transition. 
2 
In this process metropolitan and urban centers tend to press for change ,-,hile 
rural counties are likely to resist the pressure. The old '.Jays are giving ,~ay to 
new l-Jays. The question is not uhether to change or not to change, because change 
is inevitable--the only constant. The question, rather, is what changes to en-
courage and embrace, t-,hat to accept in acquiescence, l-Jhat to resist and reject. 
Every southerner l-Jill find himself confronting such questions. His posture t-1ill 
reflect his attachment to our southern heritage, his comprehension of our national 
ideals, and his commitment to the Christian faith. Yes, the South is changing, 
but from tJhat to '-1hat and for \Olhat? 
It is the purpose of this paper to reviet-J a fel-J characteristics, conditions, 
and changes in southern society and to indicate some of the challenges with which 
they confront the Christian Church. Special attention will be given to the tradi-
tional values of southern culture, the changes in the churches, population charac-
teristics, economic conditions, the racial situation, politics, and areas of dis-
organization resulting from rapid social changes. In conclusion, a few implica-
tions for the t-Jork of the church will be suggested. 
In an excellent book titled Southern Tradition ~ Regional Progress, 
Dr. I1icholls identifies flthose elements of Southern tradition l-1hich may be appro-
priately associated t'lith southern poverty and whose abandonment may be a pre-
requisite if the South is finally to put an end to its poverty. fI 
vlilliam H. Nicholls, Southern Tradition ~ Regional Progress, Chapel 
Hill, University of north Carolina Press, 1960. 
He goes on to state, 
fI ••• it is my principal thesis here that the South's serious lag in per 
capita incomes is largely attributable to its insufficient rate of in-
dustrial-urban development and that the South's lag in industrial develop-
ment is in substantial part the result of its stubborn adherence to a set 
of values inconsistent with a high rate of industrialization. So much 
said, I now turn to the heart of my analysis. Uhat are the key elements 
in the distinctively Southern tradition, Hay of life, and state of mind 
which have hampered regional economic progress? The list is long but can 
be classified for convenience into five principal categories: (1) the 
persistence of agrarian values, (2) the rigidity of the social structure, 
(3) the undemocratic nature of the political structure, (4) the l1eakness 
of social responsibility, and (5) conformity of thought and behavior. fI 
Nicholls, pp. 14-15. 
near the conclusion of his work, Dr. i~ichol1st an economist, states his viet. 
of the place of religion in the southern traditional value complex. 
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"In my initial prospectus of this book, I also intended to include as 
another element in the Southern tradition its t other-l~orldly reI igion. t 
ROlIever, upon further reflection, I decided to omit this important mat-
ter. Even so, I should perhaps make explicit the extent to \-lhich, quite 
apart from the lessons of soc ial science, my mID maturing interpretation 
and application of Christian teachings have influenced my attitudes tm'lard 
race relations. I have been forced to conclude that, quite apart from 
their economic and social aspects, traditional Southern racial attitudes 
inescapably have a moral aspect as Hell. That so few of my co-religionists 
in the South seem to see this moral issue never ceases to discourage and 
amaze me. It is a paradox that the South, \-Jhich by every objective standard 
is the most religious region in j~~n~rica, could be so blind to the practical 
implications of Christianity. Someho\.J the Southern religious tradition has 
never progressed from the Old Testament t s God of Vlrath to the New Testa-
ment's God of Love and Brot herhood, nor from an ethereal concern for the 
other \vorld to a concrete moral concern for social injustice in the here 
and nOH. In my vie\~, Southern religious attitudes have been hopelessly 
schizophrenic and outrageous ly se If -righteous." 
t!icholls, p. 163. 
The place of religion in the traditionalism 
and involved than might appear at just a glance. 
be necessary to set this in perspective. 
of the South is far more intimate 
A brief historical sketch Hill 
It is a fairly common historical generalization that the modern ,'10rld, or 
the past three or four hundred years, resulted from the convergence of Protestant-
ism as a religious syster'l , democracy as a political s~7stem, science and technology 
as a s ystem of research and development, and capitalism as a system of economics. 
These ma j or value and organizational themes emerged from the ~omb of medievalism 
unevenly and in someuhat different birth orders. Yet the kinship betueen them and 
the mutual reinforcement one of another have provided much of the dynamic and core 
value orientation of the modern \Jestern uorld. This has become something of a 
modern western \1orld synthesis replacing the medieval synthesis. 
A classic study of the relationship bet\leen relig ion and economic life in 
modern culture is that of Hax '\:eber. Centrally i 'e vJas his thesis that the 
Hax Ueber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated 
by Talcott Parsons, Ue,·) Yor~~, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. 
emergence of Protestantism provided the ethos uithin uhich capitalism t laS endmled 
"ith divine support as a tvay of 1 ife. This occurred, according to Heber, with the 
thrmling off of the traditional religious or ientations of medieval Catholicism 
through the radical Protestant doctrines of predestination, salvation, and calling. 
This puritan ethic \las developed vlith varying doctrinal emphases by calvin and his 
follmlers, the Dap"cists, and ~!esley and his Nethodists. It "las not Heber's con-
tention that any of these men or movements set out l1ith the manifest purpose to 
develop the foundations for an economic system or even a rationalizing principle 
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undergirding it. They uere devoted to the reformation of the central religious 
tasks of the \'JOrship of God and the salvation of souls. Nevertheless, these pro-
testing religious movements, along l'lith associated and, often, ' conflicting forces 
did rob medieval man of his spiritual security Hithin the Catholic Church and of 
his traditional modes of economic and political behavior. Early Protestants had 
to worle out the assurance of their salvation in the world around them. The dis-
cipline and rationalism of the monastery as a holy calling tJere, in effect, thrust 
into the open community and into the economic and political spheres. The making 
of money, the expansion of capitalistic enterprises, and the eruption of the Indus-
trial Revolution, as 'Hell, parenthetically, as the expansion of knotJledge and the 
spread of democracy, became principal fields in t.Jhich men lvorked out their spiritual 
destinies. This constituted breaks, often radical and revolutionary, l;fith medieval 
traditionalism. Traces of the historical effects of these processes can still be 
observed in Europe in that the more Protestant parts, in general, have pushed 
ahead further in the fields of economics, democracy, and science than the more 
Catholic portions. 
The United States has probably been the major critical testing ground of this 
modern societal development. In the early days it was predominantly settled by 
Protestant colonizers. They came seeking religious freedom and economic opportun-
ity. Those t4ho settled in the northern part of the country seemed to stress reli-
gious freedom most and to develop economically fastest. Those settling in the 
South seemed primarily concerned uith economic e~cploitation and Ie ss ~'lith the 
Protestant ethic. Due to a variety of factors, the southern settlers developed a 
traditional economic pattern of agriculture, substituting the plantation system 
l-1ith its cash crop and slavery for the manorial system of England "lith its rela-
tive self-sufficiency and serfdom. In the early days Protestantism dominated the 
religious composition of the United States, llorth and South. In the north, it 
flourished, largely led by left-uing Protestants, along uith the beginnings of an 
industrial economy, t]hile in the South it formed an alliance under the dominance 
of the Church of England, the right-uing of the Reformation, Hith the aristocracy 
of the planter class. ~ Jith the rise of the industrial economy o f the North, the 
Puritans became captains of industry and the call for workers brought thousands 
and millions of Catholics from agrarian Europe to industrial America. Thus, by 
the end of the First ;70 rld '; :'ar the Protestants, uhose ethic ,,,as historically 
associated t1ith the Industrial Revolution in Europe, found themselves dominant 
in the agrarian traditionalism of the plantation South, .,hile the Catholics, 
associated uith peasant agriculture in Europe, pushed touard the top in the indus-
trial cities of the North. 
Religiously the South has been as Protestant as it has been Democratic in 
politics. Again, it is a peculiar southern brand of Protestantism. This is best 
illustrated by the dominance of the Southern Baptist Church in every state in the 
Southeast. It is the sect-type form of Protestantism t"hich, stripped of its 
denominational peculiarities, t;faS dominant in the rest of the country fifty to 
one hundred years ago. One has only to attend a General Conference of The t1etho-
dist Church to note that Nethodists in the South tend to vieH Christianity through 
glasses tinted by the "southern uay of life." This applies also to Roman Catholics, 
according to a recent study of a parish in net>] Orleans. 
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Sect-type Protestantism stresses individualism in religious experience 
with little attention to social theory or ethics. Traditionally, concern is 
lJith personal morality rather than social problems, ~1ith surface cures rather 
than bas ic causes, \'lith salvation by enthusiasm rather than evangelism. In spite 
of outstanding exceptions, southern Protestantism has tended to endoH the "southern 
\'lay of life" t"i th divinity, defending it against all comers. The fact that pro-
phetic voices in pulpit and peu are today increasingly vocal in criticism of l1hat 
was formerly defended is obviously disconcerting and confusing to many traditional 
Protestants. 
Although Protestant denominations have been in competition and rivalry with 
each other, this has been more in the nature of the various factions of state 
Democratic parties, largely all of one piece, rather than serious challenges grow-
ing out of fundamentally different interpretations of religion. The results have 
been a relatively lOll percentage of the population in religious membership in 
comparison to the nation, a surplus of substandard churches too small in member-
ship and too limited in program, and a general 10~J level of professional training 
for the clergy. 
Although this southern brand of Protestantism places excessive stress on the 
Bible, giving the South the religious nicl~name "The Bible Belt," knouledge of the 
Bible, in spite of educational efforts, is eJ:tremely lmJ. In a test given at a 
southern state university, out of one hundred possible correct ansHers, one half 
of the test group of over five hundred students scored fetl1er than seventeen cor-
rect responses. In a test in the open community in the Southern Appalachian 
Nountains, the most Protestant of the Protestant South, the average score tJas 55.7 
(out of one hundred) tIith a UeH Testament score of 6~.7 and an Old Testament score 
of 45.6. A local church Immlledge test in the same area yielded an average score 
of 30.3. Almost t~Jice as much 1;'JaS l~notm about the Bible as the church. The in-
dividualistic, nonsocial responsibility vieu of religion is seen in a community 
participation score only around one-fourth as high as the church participation 
score. Religious attitudes tlere found to be fundamentalistic and sect-type in 
character. 
For several years religious membership has been grouing more rapidly than 
the population. From 1926 to 1952 the population increased by 33.7 percent uhile 
selected religious bodies increased 57.~ percent in the United States. In the 
Southeast, the population greu more rapidly by 37.0 percent, but religious member-
ship increased even more rapidly by 6G.L~ percent. The Pentecostal and Holiness 
denominations increased during this period by 532 percent in the nation and 
1,000 percent in the South. Church of God bodies increased 260 percent in the 
nation and 659 percent in the Southeast. Various Lutheran bodies (those with 
membership listed in the 1926 Census of Religious Bodies and the 1952 Church 
Distribution Studies of the Hational Council) ranl::ed fourth in size and greu by 
132 percent in the nation and 98 percent in the South. The Seventh Day Adventists 
increased 128 percent in the nation and 229 percent in the South. The American 
and Southern Baptists combined increased 100 percent in the nation and 106 percent 
in the South. The Evangelical and Reformed Church increased 60 percent in the 
nation and 22 percent in the South. The Roman Catholic Church increased 59 per-
cent in the nation and 77 percent in the South. The Brethren bodies, Nethodist, 
Presbyterians, Congregational Christians, Disciples of Christ, Protestant Episco-
pal, and Jeuish bodies all increased at rates 10~Jer than the average for the 
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country as a Hhole and in the Southeast. Some of these groups increased less 
rapidly than the population. It is apparent from this analysis that the so-
called "third force" in Christendom, the 10,Jer-c lass sect-type "people's churches" 
of today, are the most rapidly grouing groups in the nation and even more so in 
the South. Yet, churches tJith established and liturgical traditions (Roman Cath-
olics and Lutherans) are also grot.Jing more rapidly in the nation and in the South 
than the average. The Protestant Episcopal Church is grm'Jing much faster in the 
South than in the nation as a tJhole and JeHish bodies are grovling more than t~Jice 
as rapidly in the South as in the nation. 
Pe need only project these trends to find a picture of much greater plural-
ism 'tJith a bi-modal grm]th pattern composed of Holiness and sect-type groups, on 
the one hand, and liturgical and established traditions, on the other hand. The 
in-betueen denominational types (Methodists, Disciples of Christ, etc.) haVe 
relatively lou groHth rates, both in the nation and in the South. Thus, the reli-
gious ferment in the South seems largely f ired by the revival outburst of louer-
class sectism and the missionary outreach of the great liturgical churches. That 
this trend is continuing to the present time may be seen by comparing the grm'Jth 
rates of various churches from 1950 to 1962 in the United States and the Southeast. 
In the United States, the Catholics increased l!·5.8 percent and in the Southeast 
104.3 percent; the Southern Baptists L!.l~.O percent and in the Southeast 36.4 per-
cent; the £'lethodists 14.5 percent and in the Southeast 15.3 percent; and the 
Presbyterians U.S. 31.6 percent and in the Southeast 31.5 percent. The Presby-
terians Here grmJing more rapidly than the Methodists in every state in the 
Southeast. The Catholics uere increasing faster than the Presbyterians in every 
state except Kentucky and more rapidly than the Southern Baptists in all states 
of the Southeast. The Southern Baptists \Jere grm;)ing more rapidly than the Presby-
terians in all states of the Southeast except Alabama, Georgia, and Kentucky. 
The Methodists \·Jere the slm~est grmJing of all these denominations in all these 
states. 
The Church today in this region is challenged by its traditional identifi-
cation t-Jith the so-called "southern uay of life." Historically, the Southerner 
uas rooted in the plantation system, in a segregated bi-racial pattern, in states' 
rights, and in fundamentalistic Protestantism. This southern synthesis has been 
as much sanctioned and endoued tlith divinity by Protestantism as ever Has the 
medieval synthesis by Catholicism. Indeed, it survived the Revolutionary Har, 
the development of American denocracy, and 1i1as shal,en only by the defeat in the 
Civil Far. Today the movement of the sectional South into the mainstream of 
American life, ideologically and economically, is har.lpered by the inability of 
large segnents of the southern brand of Protestantism to disassociate themselves 
from traditional ruralism and agrarianism, segregation, the one-party system, 
states' rights, anti-intellectualism, anti-trade unionism, and traditional puri-
tanical behavior proscriptions. 
Just as the monolithic might of medieval Catholicisfo1 over the values, moti-
vat ions , and practices of men had to be brol~en before the developments of the 
modern uorld complex of capitalism, deli.l0Cracy, and science \'lere possible, so the 
dominance of traditionalistic Protestantism, in its peculiar southern form, must 
loosen its hold on the mind of the South before the region can enter fully into 
the pluralistic mainstream of American economic, sOGial, political, and religious 
life. Although brealdng, the traditional southern synthesis is by no means broken, 
especially in rural areas. 
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This situation poses unique intellectual and moral problems for the churches 
in the South. They find themselves in the peculiar position of bringing judgment 
to bear upon Hhat they formerly sanctioned, and both in the name of the same gospel. 
Yet the churches uhose earliest biblical traditions include a custom-breaking 
Christ and Christians who turned things upside dmm must learn again to be a saving 
and living leaven in the traditional lump, a source of stability and direction in 
the ceaseless and often disoriented changes taking place in the South, in the 
nation, and in the Horld. 
The decennial census of the population by the U. S. Bureau of Census pro-
vides, of course, the basic source of data for a study of demographic characteris-
tics and changes. In 1960 the United States reported 179.3 million population, an 
increase of 18.5 percent since 1950. Slightly under a third of this population 
(54.9 million) nas in the Census South, an increase of 16.5 percent during the 
decade. Thus, the United States as a T;lhole vlas grm'Jing more rapidly than the 
South, largely due to the very rapid groHth in the Hest. The '-lhite population, 
on the other hand, was grotJing slightly more rapidly in the South (18.0 percent) 
than in the United States (17.5 percent). The nomJhite population, mostly Negro, 
was gro\Jing more than tuice as rapidly in the United States (26.7 percent) as in 
the South (ll.l percent). In 1960, Negroes made up 10.3 percent of the U. S. 
population and 20.6 percent in the South. The l!egro population increased 25.2 per-
cent in the U. S. and only 10.3 percent in the South. 
In 1960, 69.9 percent of the U. S. population ,,,as returned as urban, "ith 
the 30.1 percent rural population divided unequally bet~Jeen rural-farm (only 7.5 
percent) and rural nonfarm (22.G percent). The increase in the urban population 
in the United States during the past decade T:las 29.3 percent. In the South it 
'Jas at a much faster rate of growth (40.1 percent). The rural nonfarm population 
(mostly suburban and built-up population around to''lns and cities) increased 
slightly more rapidly in the United States (30.2 percent) and slightly less 
rapidly in the South (37.6 percent) than the urban population itself. Hot-lever, 
the rural farn population declined (-)lH.7 percent in the United States and 
(-)50.2 percent in the South. This decline "Jas so great that, in spite of the 
rapidly grolJing rural nonfarm population, the total rural population in the 
country lost (-)0.3 percent and in the South (-)5.9 percent. During the past 
decade, the South moved from 43.6 percent to 58.5 percent of its population 
urban. Thus, for the first time, more than half the population in the South Has 
urban in 1960. In 1950, 25.2 percent of the South's population "JaS rural-farm, 
and this dropped to 10.8 percent by 1960. 
In 1950, there were 169 8etropolitan areas in the United States, and this 
increased to 212 in D60. The comparable figures for the South were 59 metro-
politan areas in 1950 and 76 in 1960. The total metropolitan population increased 
33.0 percent in the United States and 52.7 percent in the South. The gr0l4th in-
side the central cities Has 16.3 percent in the U. S. and 37.7 percent in the 
South. Actually, the greatest areas of groHth Here suburban, '-lith 55.9 percent 
increase in metropolitan population outside the central cities in the United 
States and 78.5 percent increase in the South. Small cities, under 50,000 popUla-
tion, are much more important in the South than in the nation as a l~hole. This 
may be seen in the fact that the metropolitan population made up 90.1 percent of 
the total urban population in the United States but only 35.4 percent in the South. 
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The age and sex structure of the population provides important clues to 
the productive-dependency situation and to churches attempting to minister to the 
spiritual needs of all the people. In the United States as a uhole, 32.2 per-
cent of males and 30.2 percent of females uere under 15 years of age, while those 
65 years and older made up 8.5 percent of the males and 10.0 percent of females. 
For nonwhites, those under 15 comprised 38.7 percent of males and 36.6 percent of 
females I nhile those 65 and over tJere 6.0 percent for males and 6.3 percent for 
females. This meant that 59.5 percent of total males were in the productive age 
groups betueen 15 and 65, as lIell as 59.9 percent of females. This lJaS 55.3 per-
cent for nonuhite males and 57.2 percent for nontlhite females. Thus, it is ob-
vious that the productive lJorkers among nomlhi tes must support a larger propor-
tion of nont,Jorkers than is true for uhi tes. 
In the total South, 33.7 percent of males and 31.7 percent of females t-lere 
under 15 years of age, l>1hile 7.7 percent of tta.les and 9.0 percent of females uere 
65 and over. In the total population in the South, a smaller proportion of per-
sons in the productive age groups must support a larger proportion of young and 
old dependents. This picture, houever, is accentuated by the large proportion of 
nonwhi tes in the South. This may be seen in the fact that 31.0 percent of vJhite 
males and 30.0 percent of uhite females uere under 15 years of age, compared to 
40.7 percent of nom·Jhite males and 33.1 percent of nonuhite females. It is the 
case that. due to better medical facilities, more ,Jhites than nonuhites are in 
the 65 and over age groups in the South. This lJas 0.0 percent for lJhite males, 
9.5 percent for uhite females, in contrast to 6.6 percent for nontlhite males and 
7.1 percent for nonuhite females. Yet overall, the dependency ratio is higher 
for the South than the United States and highest of all for nont.Jhites in the South. 
The burden falls upon those segments of the population uith a surplus of lmJ-
income and a deficit of high-income jobs. 
In 1960, 63.8 percent of ' males and 65.8 percent of females 14 years of age 
and over were reported married, 25.5 percent of males and 19.2 percent of females 
':-Jere single, 3.6 percent of males and 12.2 percent of females vJere uidoned, and 
2.1 percent of males and 2.0 percent of" females uere divorced. ' The uhites had a 
s light tendency to be more married Hhile the nonuhites had more single, lJidovled, 
and divorced persons. The llhite population in the South lJaS the most" married 
and the nonwhite population the ieast. HmJever, there Has less divorce among the 
nont-1hites of the South than of the nation. 
Traditionally, the natural increase rate has been higher in the South than 
in the nation as a Hhole. Around 1910, for example, the gross reproduction Has 
44 to 59 percent higher in the South than in other regions, due largely to the 
dominance of the farm population. Since \Torld Har II the gap between the fertility 
in the South and in the nation has been growing smaller. For exar,lple, in 1960, 
the average number tif children under five per l,doo llomEm 15 to L~9 years old in 
the 'nation tlaS only about L:. percent belm.J tlie average ' of the rates in the southern 
states, ,jhereas in 1950 it ~Jas about 12 percent louer. The slmmess in the groHth 
rates of the southern population, then, has been due largely to net outmigration. 
This outmigrationbecame heavy for liegroes and uhites follm'Jing Horld Har I. 
This was the period during which immigration quotas reduced the migration of popu-
lation from outside the ' country. Huch of this migration has been from farms to 
cities. Nore than a third of the South's farm population uas lost through net 
migration from 19L~0 to 1950 (5.5 million). Every state in the South, excep1::ing 
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Florida, Virginia, and T~cas, lost population by net outmigration from 1950 to 
1960. Only Florida sho~Jed any appreciable gain through migration (5(3.3 percent). 
The greatest losses Here recorded b y Arkansas (-22.7 percent), Nississippi 
(-19.9 percent), and Kentucky (-13.2 percent). Four states gained through net 
migration of Hhites. Three of these gained ver y small amounts: Virginia, 
Louisiana, Texas. Florida gained 70 percent (1.5 million) or enough to cause 
the southern states to receive 52,000 more Hhites than migrated out. The net 
number of nom.Jhites migrating out during the decade totalled 1.4 million. Only 
Florida and Louisiana had a net gain o f nomJhites through migration, TJ1ith the 
remaining southern states losing in a range from (-)2.7 percent for TeJcas to 
(-)35.0 percent for Arkansas. Other states having large proportions of nonHhites 
lost through migration uere Hississippi (-32.7 percent), South Carolina (-26.5 
percent), and Alabama (-22.0 percent). 
Allan P. Sindler, editor, Change in ~ Contemporary South, Durham, U. C., 
Duke University Press, 1963, p. 31. 
In 1960, 32.5 percent of the nonnhite population of the United States was not 
living in the state in ~~hich they l-Jere born, and this · t1aS 29.2 percent for the 
t'Jhite population. For those still in the South in D60, a larger percentage Has 
living in the state of birth (83.0 percent for nomJhites and 71.1 percent for 
l·,hites). The higher rate of r"obilit~7 for nonuhites for the United States may be 
further seen in the fact that 52.1 percent had changed residences from 1955 to 
1960, and this HaS L~9. 8 percent for tJhites. i\gain, nonuhites remaining in the 
South l'Jere less mobile (L~7.3 percent). Houever, 53.7 percent of the \·,hites had 
changed residences froru 1 955 to 1960. Even so, this meant that 52.4 percent of 
the population five years and older in 1960 had changed residences during the 
past five years in the South. If this process were equally spread over a decade, 
no one Hould be living in the same house as Hhen the previous census lJas taken. 
Uhile mobility could not be extended in a straight line this way, obviously, many 
people move more than once in a five-year period. This is a picture of very 
great movement of population and it has important consequences for the Church. 
Generally speaking, persons u ith less than five years of schooling are con-
sidered functional illiterates. In 1950, for the U. S. as a whole, 11.1 percent 
of the population 25 years of age and over uere illiterates, and this nas 18.l~ 
percent in the South. There were considerable i mproveiJents so that illiteracy 
had dropped by 1960 to O. '-~ percent in the nation and 14.0 percent in the South. 
For t-Jhites, this Has 6.7 percent in the nation and 10.0 percent in the South; 
for nomJhites 23. L:. percent for the nation and 31.7 percent for the South. In 
1950, the median school years completed for the nation lJaS 9.3 and in the South 
8.6, a difference of 0.7 years. In 1960, the nation reached 10.5 and the South 
9.6, a difference of 1.0. Thus, for the total population, there had been improve-
ments in the South and in the nation, bu t the lag betlJeen the South and the nation 
had increased in terms of median years of school completed. For the ' Jhite popula-
tion 25 years of age and over, the median years of school completed for the nation 
Has 10.9 and for the South 10.4, a difference of 0.5. For the nonuhites in the 
U. S. the median Has 8.2 and in the South 7.1, a difference of 1.1 years. In the 
complex occupational structure of the modern technological order, less than high 
school graduation mal:::es it difficult for persons to absorb the technical training 
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necessary for skilled jobs. \1ith unskilled jobs decreasing and unemployment 
rates increasing among those tJithout high school graduation, education through 
high school and beyond becomes extremely important. Yet in 1960, 59.0 percent 
of the total U. S. population 25 years of age and over had 11 or fel',-Jer years of 
school completed and this ''las 64.6 percent in the South. The comparable figures 
f9r the .. ,hites ,~ere 56.9 percent for the U. S. and 60.2 percent for the South, 
Hhile there 'Jere 78.3 percent for the U. S. and 85.0 percent for the South among 
nonwhites. These t'lere, in every case, the percentage of the adult population 
\lith less than high school graduation. It is obvious that educational forces 
in the nation, aod especially in the South, have much unfinished business in 
the years ahead, 
It is anticipated that the South t>1ill hold, perhaps t"ith very slight losses, 
its present proportion of the national population. The estimated population in 
1963 was 188.8 million for the United States and 58.2 million for the South, 
30.8 percent of the '~otal. By 1970 the U. S. population is projected at 211.4 
million and the South 65.1 million. The present guess for 1980 is 252.0 million 
in the United State$ and 77.6 million in the South. 
From "Econolllic Problem number One" to "Economic Opportunity I·lumber One" 
since the Great Depression, the South has moved more rapidly than the nation as 
a 1',-10ole along several economic indices. It is clearly departing from its old 
agrarian status as a supplier of ra'J materials for northern manufacture and 
moving tOl',Jard incre~1?ing industria1izat ion. 
Southern agriculture itself is changing uith less hand labor and more mechan-
ization, ",ith larger commercially profitable farms, better trained farmers, fet.Jer 
subsistence and substandard farms, and a great reduction in sharecropping and 
tenancy. The inoome of famers is far belml that of other segments of the labor 
force. The average ipcome for the nonfarm population in 1959 lIas $2,202 and for 
tl1e farm population $9(50. Uhat is true of the nation as a t'Jhole is exaggerated 
in the South. For example, the level of living inde)c for 1956 lIas 145 for U. S. 
farmer~ and 119 for farmers in the Soutq, These trends have been accompanied 
by a deorease in the number of gainful ~lOrl~ers employed in agricu Iture. One 
hundred years ago, 50 percent of all gainful Horkers "ere employed in agriculture, 
,.,ith l~O percent in nonagricultural pursuits. Today it. is around 10 percent in 
agriculture tIith 90 percent in nonagricultural jobs. From 1950 to 1960, in the 
South, the nunber of persons 14 years of age and older engaged in agriculture 
dropped from 3.2 million to 1.7 raillion ( ... Lj·6.6 percent), l1ith the negro loss 
only 1.6 percent greater than the uhite. In 1960~ there t1ere 1.2 million tIhite 
and 0.5 million Uegro vlorl~ers in agriculture in the South. This dramatic decline 
in the number of lJorkers in agriculture has beep accompanied by a phenomenal in-
crease in the productivity of the farms and over-provision for food and fiber 
for the nation, Around the turn of t~ century, every farmer produced enough for 
himself and seven others, l"hile today he supports himself plus 28 others. Nuch 
of this increase in efficiency has been achieved since the last Har. Indeed, 
agricultural output has been increasing more rapidly than our population, even 
during the so-called population explosion,"" Using the years from 1910-1914 as 
100, the index numper for population groHt.h in 195.:3 uas 133 and for farm output 
197. The farm output t-Jas 22 percent higher in 1953 thsn in 1948. This has been 
accompanied by a decrease of the fann and rural population with the usual impact 
upon rural institutions, especially country churches. Agricultural ghost tot-JUS 
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and villages are appearing. Hotl1 to keep religion alive and hopeful in the midst 
of decline and decay is a sobering problem confronting hundreds of village and 
country churches today. Can the church become a Itt-Jell of living water" in the 
"institutional deserts" of declining population areas? 
The great shift has been in the grotl1th of manufacturing. It is well known 
that the proportion of the labor force in manufacturing is a good indicator of 
the economic ~Je11-being of the people. In the South, in 1958 this \vas 21.4 per-
cent, co[apared to 33.L~ percent in the Northeast. Furthermore, much of the employ-
ment \>1as of the type making use of relatively cheap, unskilled labor, abundant 
tl1ater supply, and raw materials. Exceptions were the rapid manufacturing grmvth 
areas in the Gulf Crescent and in a fet-1 other subregions throughout the South. 
Net~ plants tend to settle largely in or near metropolitan areas, but it is a poor 
Sind1er. p. 44. 
town in the South today that does not have or is not searching for a factory of 
some sort. 
The South increased the ntlmber of persons employed in nonagricultural estab-
lishments by 26 percent from 1950 to 1963, uhile this lIas 25 percent for the 
nation as a ~,'ho1e. The value of foreign commerce in the South increased 11.2 per-
cent to 3.4 percent for the United States from 1962 to 1963, with greater improve-
ments in exports than in imports. Bank deposits increased 103.7 percent from 1950 
to 1963 in the South and 37.3 percent in the nation. 
The South's share of the gross national product has been grm"ing during and 
since the war. l!e~~ construction nOH is increasing at about the same rate in the 
South as in the nation and should reach 17.2 billion in 1965. Retail sales are 
expected to increase by 34 percent for the United States and by 38 percent for 
the South. The registration of motor vehicles is projec to grow by 36 per-
cent for the country and l~L~ percent for the South from 1955 to 1965. These are 
indicators of the dramatic economic changes taking place in the South. 
Summarized from John L. Fulmer. "Southern Economic Development, 1955 to 
1965: A Look Ahead, It Southern Economic Journal 23, April, 1957, 411-420. 
The median income per family moved from $3,073 to $5,560 in the U. S~ ·.from 
1950 to 1%0. In the South, the gain t-1as from $2,248 to $4,465. Hhile the 
changes in the purchasing value of the dollar uould make these gains look less 
impressive, the gap bet~~een the median incomes of families bet~Jeen the South and 
the United States actually \lidened during the decade. The poverty population is 
being defined as families of four ui th under $3,000 income. Family income here 
is not provided by size of family, but 21.4 percent of the families in the United 
States reported under $3,000 income and this >:'las 33.0 percent in the South. The 
improvements from 1950 may be seen in the fact that at that time 46.0 percent of 
the United States families reported under $3,000 and 60.9 percent in the South. 
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It is t'lell knotm that Im,1 income families tend to be larger than high income 
families, especially in the South. This means that a much larger proportion of 
the poverty population is concentrated in the South than in the nation as a 
whole. A closer look Hill indicate some of the reasons for this. Using the 
median income in 1959 of persons Hith income, rather than of family incomes, 
this was $4,103 for males in the United States and $3,044 in the South. In the 
U. S. urban population, this uas $4·,532, $3,701 in the South; rural nonfarm popula-
tion, $3,297 in the U. S., $2,427 in the South; rural farm population, $2,098 in 
the U. S. and $1,467 in the South. The l"Jhite males in the United States had a 
median income of $4,319 and in the South ~3,473 compared to the nonl1hite male in 
the United States of $2,273 and in the South $1,615. Since the South has a larger 
than average proportion of its population rural and nont-lhite, these facts depress 
the median income of persons in the labor force. These differentials between the 
United States and the South hold for professional, managerial, and technical 
people ($6,640 for U. S. males and $5,984 for southern males), farm managers 
($2,136 for U. S. and $1,3Cl for South), craftsmen, foremen, and so on ($5,240 
for U. S. and $4,31L~ for South), operatives and other factory \17orlters ($4,282 for 
U. S. and $3,196 for South), farm laborers and farm foremen ($1,107 for U. S. and 
$865 for South), and other laborers ($2,940 for U. S. and $2,039 for South). 
Obviously, the relative income position of the South has improved since 1929. 
In 1929, for example, the range by states in the percentage of the per capita per-
sonal income of the national figure 1;las from Sotlth Carolina (38 percent) to Florida 
(74 percent). In 1960, the range uas from Nississippi (53 percent) to Florida 
(89 percent). Virginia increased from 62 percent of the national level in 1929 
to 83 percent in 1960, North Carolina from 48 percent to 71 percent, South caro-
lina from 38 percent to 63 percent, Georgia from 50 percent to 72 percent, 
Florida from 74 percent to 89 percent, Tennessee from 54 percent to 70 percent, 
Alabama from 46 percent to 66 percent, l-.iississippi from 41 percent to 53 percent, 
Arkansas from 11·3 percent to 60 percent, Louis iana from 59 percent to 72 percent, 
Texas from 68 percent to 87 percent, and Kentucky 56 percent to 69 percent. 
Sindler, p. 34. 
The per capita income in 1950 was $1,660 for the United States and $1,195 for 
the South. In 1963, the United States had moved to $2,443 and the South to $1,956. 
Thus, Hhile improvements lJere seen in the South and the United States, the gap tJas 
somel.1hat larger in 1963 than in 1950. The long-term relative improvements seem to 
be slo';ling do~m. 
A study of the occupational structure indicates that there are proportionately 
more people engaged in low income occupations in the South than in the country as 
a tJhole. For example, there are feHer male professional and technical wor1~ers in 
the South (8.7 percent) than in the United States (10.3 percent), more farmers 
(7.2 percent in the South and 5.5 percent in the U. S.) and laborers (8~3 percent 
in the South and 6.9 percent in the nation). In the South, the contrast is due, 
to a large extent, to the differences between the tJhite and the nonuhite popula-
tions. For example, in the South, among employed whites, 9.9 percent ~.ere profes-
sional and technical workers, contrasted to 2.9 percent for nonwhites; managers, 
13 
off icials, and proprietors (12.6 percent for uhites and 1.5 percent for nom-1hites), 
craftsmen (20.5 percent for l-1hites and 8.G percent for nonwhites), farm laborers 
(3.0 percent for tIhites and 1l.4 percent for nontIhites), and other laborers 
(5.2 percent for l~hi tes and 22.9 percent for nonuhites). Thus, the similarities 
betHeen the t.Jhites in the United States and in the South are much greater than the 
total male tmrkers in the United States and in the South or the loJhite and nom1hite 
male uorkers in the South. ~1evertheless. the South has a surplus of low-wage 
earners and a deficit of high-income people in the occupational structure. 
Another aspect of the economic picture has been the grot.Jth of trade unionism. 
From 1939 to 1953, total union membership increased 143.0 percent for the United 
States and 187.5 percent for the South. South carolina had 307.4 percent grot-1th 
during this period, and several southern states increased by over 200 percent in 
union membership. Continued unionization of t10rker& 'may be expected in the future. 
The South has already been the battleground for much labor-management strife, and 
this, too, may be expected to continue. 
In spite of these astounding changes in the economic position of the South, 
poverty is still a dominant characteristic for great se~aents of the population. 
There are not in the nation two greater depressed groups than rural farm Negroes, 
especially in the Old Plantation South, and the uhite subsistence farmers and ex-
miners in the mountains. Fortunately, outmigration is heavy among both these 
groups, but human problems of training, re-training, uelfare, medical care, and 
common decencies are great. These are becoming national problems involving the 
receiving cities of the North and Hest as uell as the depopulating sending areas 
of the South. 
Politically, the South is a victim of the one-party system. The Democratic 
Party has controlled the state governments of all except the border states for 
over half a century. In spite of the grouing urban centers, political pot>1er re-
mains in the courthouse gangs of rural and declining counties. Only occasionally 
have state officials emerged from their "states' rights" cocoons to vieu realistic-
ally the national, to sa~l nothing of the international, scene. The internation-
alism of the southern senators and representatives a decade or so ago seems to 
have given t-1ay to a neu isolationism. The South may be replacing the Niddle ('Jest 
as the locale of isolationism in a uorld Hhere the doctrine is more out of date 
than eve.r. The one-party rule in the South has not faced critical political competi-
tion or debate for so long that a curious type of Southern Democratic Party has 
emerged. This southern brand of democracy, ~Jith the blessings of the southern 
brand of religion, HaL ted for the Supreme Court to out 1avJ the uhi te primary and 
the county unit system in Georgia, and to order reapportionment and the desegre-
gation of public schools. It is more often at odds tJith the national Democrats 
than t'lith the Republicans. It is not only conservative but reactionary in many 
of its aspects. It is little uonder that election machinery disfranchises not 
only Negroes but, also, thousands of liberals through a lacl~ of adequate politi-
cal machinery "hereby any viable choice is possible. An illustration of this 
dilemma nas the situation in many southern states uhich made it impossible for 
Democrats to vote for the na'cional Democratic ticket for the presidency in Uovem-
ber, 1960. The effort in the 1%4 election to \'1in the most reactionary and con-
servative elements of the Democratic Party over to .the Goldt-Jater brand of 
Republicanism is another aspect of this picture. A continuing result of this 
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situation is a lower percentage of eligible citizens registered and voting in the 
South than in the rest of the nation. In the 1956 presidential election, for 
instance, several states in the Hiddle Uest and Uortheast had three-fourths of 
their citizens of voting age actually voting, ~Ihile this did not reach SO percent 
for any southern state and dropped to 22.1 percent in one state. This is due 
partly to lethargy among "Ihites but more largely to the failure of Negro voters 
to register and vote. There are counties in southern states l-li th from 50 to 80 
percent of the population negro and no registered Negro voters at all. 
One of the most visible characteristics of the South is the bi-racial nature 
of its population. There are relatively feH foreign-born \l1hi tes but around one-
fifth of the population is Negro, bIice the national average. 
In 1850, about all the t1egroes lived in the South uhere they composed 37.3 
percent of the population. Since then there has been a steady decline of negro 
percentage of the population in the South, and it stands today at roughly one-
half the proportion of one hundred years ago. From 1800 to 1950 the Hhite popu-
lation gre>J more rapidly than the 11egro, but the latter seems to have stabil ized 
at around 10 percent of the national population. There has been a great increase 
in the negro population outside the South. Sometime bettveen not-) and 1970 there 
t>Jill actually be more llegroes living outside than inside the South, and for the 
first time since lCOO there should be feuer l!egroes in the South in 1970 than in 
1960. Thus, the program of l1egro-tlhite relations is rapidly becoming a national, 
instead of a distinctively Southern, problem and must be dealt \~ith in the light 
of national rather than regional ideals and purposes. 
It is against this type of background that the present push for equality of 
opportunity and access to public facil ities on the part of negroes needs to be 
understood. The 1 95i.!· Supreme Court decision in the public school field ,,,as only 
the most important of a ~·]hole series of such decisions implementing the American 
ideals of freedom and equality. In 19SL!·, seventeen states and the District of 
Columbia required racial separation in their schools. In 1962, eight years later, 
only 7. 3 percent of the l!egro pupils Here in integrated schools, and this lIas 
0.4 percent in the Resistant states and 51.1 percent in the Compliant states 
(DelatoJare, D. C., Kentucky, Haryland, Hissouri, Oklahoma, and H st Virginia). 
J. Kenneth 11or1and, Token Desep;regation and Beyond, Southern Regional 
Council, Atlanta, Georgia, p. L~. 
Y7hen the uhite primary l1as declared uncons 'citutional in 19L:.4, only around 
5 percent of voting-age Uegroes tlere registered to vote. This increased sharply 
to 25 percent by 1956 and stood at 23 percent in 1960 uith variations by states. In 
1940, less than 0.5 percent of the l!egroes "ere registered in I:1ississippi, Ala-
bama, South Carolina, and Louisiana. Registration ranged from 2 percent in Georgia 
to 16 percent in TeJcas. In 1960, only 6 percent uere registered in 11ississippi, 
14 percent in Alabama, 23 percent in Virginia, and no data for South carolina or 
Georgia. Other states ranged from 30 percent in Texas to 48 percent in Tennessee .. 
There ' -Jas the tJidest variation in negro registrations by counties uithin states, 
from 89 percent of the counties in l1ississippi having less than 10 percent 
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registered to Tennessee uith 29 percent of the counties shouing 90 percent or more 
registered. These voter registrations for t;egroes Here most highly associated or 
correlated uith such factors as the percentage of nonuhite labor force in tJhite-
collar occupations (+.23), nOnlJhite median school years completed (+.22), nontJhite 
median income (+.19), and percentage of total church membership Roman Catholic 
(+.15). Registrations uere negatively correlated vlith the percentage of popula-
tion Negro, 1950 (- .• L!.6), percentage of population Negro in 1900 (-.41), percentage 
of farms operated by tenants (-.32), uhite median school years completed (-.26), 
percentage of labor force in agriculture (-.20), percentage of population belong-
ing to a church (-.17), percentage of total church membership Baptist (-.10). 
Sindler, pp. 124-123 . 
Under the impetus of the various voter registration efforts, a report from the 
Southern Regional Council indicates that 598,345 nonuhites l-lere registered from 
April, 1962 . through Ljay, 196Ll· in the South. At present the registered nom-Ihites 
make up 12.2 percent of the total registra·tion and 3L! •• 9 percent of the nomlhites 
of voting age population. The t"hites constitute 87.7 percent of the total regis-
tration and 62.8 percent of the tlhite voting age population. 
- It is almost inconceivable that much of the southern brand of Protestantism 
has and still does approve of these conditions and does little to champion the 
cause of voter registration for uhites, much less llegroes. This is simply another 
evidence of the southern churches raising uhite supremacy to the level of the 
Godhead. 
Uith the very recent passage and signing into lau of the Civil Rights Bill, 
a dramatic climax has been reached in the post-Uorld Har activity in the field 
of race relations. These activities have involved courts, legislatures, executive 
branches of government, voluntary groups, business groups, and the churches. 
Hriting in the summer of 1 952, John B. Frank stated the folloHing: 
"The ttJenty-five years just past have seen an amaz ing re-establishment 
of moral opposition to racial discrimination in the United States. 
Indeed, though it t]ould be impossible to prove, I suspect that in the 
past fifteen years the proportion of the whole population which has 
shared a sense of deep ob j ection, on moral grounds, to mistreatment of 
Ilegroes, is quantitatively greater than the proportion of the popula-
tion l1hich felt that objection in 1866. Once again, the courts have 
both gone along " i th and promoted this moral objection, and a series 
of judicial decisions have substantially brought the modern meaning of 
equal protection of the lalls." 
S.indler, p. 67. 
16 
Yet the road ahead is long and hard. Frank points to 
" ••• at least three hard consequences of the three hundred years 
which desegregation, by itself, Hill no-t affect: (a) poverty, with 
all its consequences. (b) a depressed and defensive outlook on life, 
with all this may mean in terms of meeting community responsibilities. 
That Negroes may gain the right to vote does not, for exar,lple, mean that 
they "t-1ill necessarily exercise it for a long time to come. The child 
who turns a classroom, segregated or unsegregated, into a blac~board 
jungle is the child Hho entered from a street that ,Jas an armed camp, and 
desegregation may not affect his motivations at all. (c) learning limi-
tations. These are the products today both of generations and of a per-
sonal lifetime of undernourishment and unintellectual environment. Ho 
amount of desegregation Hill make equal and educational opportunities 
for these t\-10 pupils: one born illegitimately to an eighteen-year-old 
mother, not l~nmJing his father t having no home but a crm.Jded room, nQ 
balanced and adequate nourishment, no touch of intellectual stimulus 
or even interest in the Horld beyond his street; the other born to a 
fairly routine middle-class background, adequately fed and housed, 
moderately traveled, his school progress an object of close attention 
by both parents. Heaningful educational opportunities for number One 
requires considerably more than putting him into the same classroom as 
Number Two." 
Sindler, p. 85. 
Dr. Edgar Thompson of Duke University speaks of the present day South and 
the Second Emancipation. 
"If emancipation involves freedom to move it also involves freedom to 
appear. As slaves negroes '-1ere hidden auay on the private estates of the 
planters and as migrants to the cities they '.Jere concealed behind the 
walls of the ghetto slums. Slavery consists not only in being deprived 
of freedom to move but also in being denied a public and visible existence. 
The changes ~le nmJ are \"3i tness ing describe a process of negroes rising 
into public sight from their previous obscurity in city ghettoes. They 
are putting in an appearance in the theaters, on the streets, on the high-
Hays, on the trains and buses, in the voting booths, and in the schools 
and colleges. They are ever)"-lhere, in places '1here before they rarely 
ventured. They are conspicuous, they are out in the public, they are 
being noticed. They are, in short, being emancipated a second time. 
"He are living in an age of 't'10rldtJide er,lancipations. All sorts and condi-
tions of people--'t'1Omen. children, teen-agers, sectarians, ,1Orkers, natives, 
colonials, peasants--ai~ being emancipated from real or fancied states of 
oppression all over the '-lorld. Again ue hear much talk of the t natural r 
rights of man, a kind of tall~ 't'1hich tells more about situations of change 
than it does about Hhat natural rights are, but all these people seeking 
more freedom agree on at least one natural and inalienable right in com-
mon and that is, the right to complain aiJout their lack of rights. They 
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are complaining so effectively that the holders of traditional status powers 
are recognizing rights of sone sort on the part of those surging up from 
belo~ ) and demand i ng theia . 
"The second emancipation of the negro, the American phase of this Horld-
~~ide status struggle, is more fundamental and, for the future, far more 
important than the first one. Its present manifestations--such as freedom 
rides, restaurant picl~eting, school and university desegregation. and other 
events uhich cotfu-:tand the head1ines--may be mere surface manifestations of a 
more profound change taking place in the ethos of the negro and an earnest 
of changes taldng place or about to take place in the basic structure of 
Southern society. The first emancipation gave iJegroes freedom to move 
around and to choose their mm employers, but it ~-Jidened rac ia1 distances 
and made Southern institutions much more racially exclusive. Legal 
slavery disappeared lJith the first emancipation, but the idea of race, 
'tJhich in part originated as a rationalization of slavery, became an 
end-valt!e in itself and uent even deeper into the structure of Southern 
society than before." 
Sindler, pp. 111-112. 
The efforts of llegroes to attend uhite churches on a nonsegregated basis, the 
so-called "kneel-ins," must cause sensitive churches to hang their heads in shame. 
Negroes have been seated on a nonsegregated basis by some congregations and re-
fused admission by others. The picture of Christians, perhaps of the very same 
denomination, being refused admission to services of Horship because of color 
presents a problem of great urgency to church leaders. As a church "Ie can say 
little that is more than double tall~ about schools, voting, and economic oppor-
tunities until ue see that all people have equal opportunities for t'lOrship and 
religious education. 
These are evidences of an enduring tradition of racial separation in travail 
and transition. 
These and other trends point to a soc1e~y in transition. Rapid social 
changes aluays involve disorganization and disorder. Social problems are 1il~ely 
to be produced on the bacl~ s i de, so to say-; by a region in social crises, even 
in cases \Jhere the changes themselves may be deemed desirable. Social problems 
arise from conflicts in values, from loosening of traditional ties, from differ-
ential rates of change, and from unexpected social emergents. An example is the 
rending of personal and social moral ties in rapid vertical or horizontal mobility. 
The disorganization occurring in persons and families in moves from the rural 
delta or mountains to the urban Hest or north is measured in rising rates of 
juvenile and adult crimes against per son and property, broken homes and the home-
less aged, unemployment and uelfare probler.ls, mental and emotional difficulties. 
The need for prison reform and the rehabilitation of prisoners is great indeed 
in the South. In recent ,-JorL~ in this f i eld, it nas discovered as a Horking 
hypothesis of many prison and parole officials that religion contributed little 
to the rehabilitation of prisoners upon release into the open community. Inter-
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generational ties become tenuous in the face of family dispersion. Schools, 
clubs, churches, and mass communications are poor substitutes for parents, 
grahdparents t and other relations in the socialization of the young into a 
strong and stable moral structure. For example, the almost exclusive dependence 
on age-graded peer groupings in social, recreational, and educational affairs~ 
in, the absence of firm intergenerational ties in the background, however neces-
sary and useful, tends to produce truncated socialization, emotional ~yopia, 
and e"cessive "nmmess" in value orientations. Adolescent turbulence ' is only 
the most disruptive of the uneasy llinds that blot) through our age-graded super-
structure uhen the intergenerational familistic foundations have been ~1eal~ened. 
In the long run t cultural crisis and social probler.J.s exist nOtJhere except in the 
minds of human beings. Social problems are important only because they produce 
problem persons and are problems to people. The Church is in the business of 
socializing the young and re-training the old in the best of the past to meet 
the changing present and to prepare for an uncertain future. The Christian faith 
has an unusual stake in this process because at its best it concerns the core 
values of the past, is realistic about the fleeting frailties of the present, 
and is hopeful about the ultimate outcome of the future under God. 
